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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction rendered 
against Mr. Tuero following a jury trial on December 12, 1986. 
Following a pre-sentence investigation by Alcohol Counseling and 
Education Center, Mr. Tuero was sentenced to a suspended term of 
six months jail. He was also ordered to serve ten days community 
service, attend Alcoholic Anonymous, pay a $500.00 fine and 
surcharge, pay $100.00 into the victim restitution fund, and pay 
$150.00 for alcohol treatment as conditions of his probation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 30, 1986, Officer Bridge observed a driver he 
believed was slumped over the wheel of his car on about Fifth South 
at 300 West in Salt Lake City. He followed the vehicle and about 
five blocks later pulled the driver over for weaving. The officer 
testified Mr. Tuero was driving within the posted speed limit and 
never hit the curb, drove off the road or sideswiped any cars. The 
officer never asked if Mr. Tuero's 1974 Dodge Dart had either 
steering or mechanical problems. 
The officer testified Mr. Tuero's speech was slurred 
although the odor of alcohol about Mr. Tuero was only slight. Mr. 
Tuero told the officer he had both diabetes and heart problems. Mr. 
Tuero admitted to the officer he had had a "few beers" before 
driving. At trial, Mr. Tuero testified he had two beers before 
driving. 
The officer testified Mr. Tuero only flipped his fingers 
around when asked to perform the field sobriety test involving 
counting fingers and therefore the officer discontinued the tests 
because he believed Mr. Tuero was uncooperative. Mr. Tuero 
testified he was hard of hearing and did not understand what was 
being asked of him. 
No intoxilyzer test was given. Mr. Tuero testified he did 
not take the test because he was afraid the "cops might beat him up" 
and he just wanted to "get it over with." The state trooper 
performed a calculation using the Widmark formula and determined Mr. 
Tuero's blood alcohol level would have been .00 based upon his 
weight and the two beers he had consumed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Tuero's r ight to a fa i r t r i a l on the charge of DUI was 
subs t an t i a l l y abridged when the t r i a l court fa i led to remove a 
venireperson for cause whose wife had been broadsided by a drunk 
driver. Additionally, failure of the tria}. court to allow defense 
counsel to inquire of the virepeople if any thought the penalties 
for a DUI conviction were either too harsh or too light failed to 
allow defense counsel to ascertain if such prejudices existed. This 
restriction interfered with Mr. Tuero's right to a fair trail. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
MR. TOERO WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE JUDGE 
FAILED TO REMOVE A PREJUDICIAL JUROR FOR CAUSE. 
During Voir Dire of the prospective jurors, defense counsel 
moved to strike Mr. Carter for cause: 
JUDGE: Any of you have relatives or family members or 
friends who have been involved in a collision where a 
person was alleged to be Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol or Drugs? Alright, uh, let's see, Mr. Carter. 
#4: My wife was broadsided by a drunk driver. 
JUDGE: Alright. Would your relationship there and your 
knowledge of that uh, cause you to bring any bias to the 
case[,] any feelings one way or another? Do you think you 
could decide [sic] the case fairly based solely upon the 
evidence and the law? 
(T. 10-11) Mr. Matsuno also indicated he had two cousins killed by 
a drunk driver. Id. 
The tape recorded proceeding not only fails to indicate any 
response to the judge's question by Mr. Carter but also indicates 
the judge failed to pause to allow Mr. Carter time to respond. 
Defense counsel moved to strike Mr. Carter for cause indicating to 
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the court, "you've got to be prejudicefd] if your wife's been 
broadsided by a drunk driver." (T. 17). The judge continued her 
inquiry of the venirepersons: 
JUDGE: Let me just ask a couple of further inquires. Uh, 
let me put it to each of you, uh again. Would the 
relationships that you have with either people who have 
been involved in collisions. A couple of you answered to 
that urn, or your knowledge of that cause you any difficulty 
in hearing uh, the case today. In other words, do you 
think that would enter into your decision so that you could 
not follow the instructions that the court will give you on 
the law. Uh, [a]nd I believe it was Mr. Carter and Mr. 
Matsuno, who answered to specifically about people they 
knew were involved. I don't know if there were some other 
people. Mr. Carter, would you have any difficulty in 
hearing the case today, based upon . . . . I asked you that 
previously, based upon your knowledge of what occurred? 
#4 I don't believe so. Everybody has there[sic] own moral 
issue on alcohol and driving. 
JUDGE: But you f e e l t h a t r e g a r d l e s s of t h a t exper i ence 
t h a t you have had p r e v i o u s l y , you could hear t h i s case 
j u s t , and determine i t s o l e l y on t h i s c a s e . The f a c t s t h a t 
y o u ' l l de termine and the law t h a t w i l l be given t o you. 
JUDGE: And Mr. Matsuno, uh, the same q u e s t i o n t o you. You 
i n d i c a t e d p r e v i o u s l y , some r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
#11: I d o n ' t know how t o answer t h a t . Uh, I have some 
op in ions a s t o the way the law should be . 
(T. 17-18). Whereupon a discussion was held in which Mr. Matsuno 
indicated he did not believe he could follow the law and was removed 
for cause. No further questions were put to Mr. Carter. 
Defense counsel challenged pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 
35, Section 18, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) Mr. Carter for 
cause. The court denied the motion. (T. 21). The defendant 
subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge and Mr. Carter was 
excused. 
Utah's Legislature has established guidelines for removing 
a juror for cause in criminal cases: 
The challenge for cause is an objection to a 
particular juror and may be taken on one or more of 
the following grounds: 
(4) The existence of any social, legal, business, 
fiduciary or other relationship between the 
prospective juror and any other party, . . . which 
when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable 
minds that the prospective juror would be unable or 
unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of 
favortism . . . . 
(14) That a state of mind exists on the part of the 
juror with reference to the cause, or to either 
party, which will prevent him from acting 
impartially and without prejudice to the substantial 
rights of the party challenging . . . . 
§77-35-18(e), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
The Utah Supreme Court has established as prejudicial error 
compelling a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a 
venireman who should have been excused for cause. State v. Lacey, 
665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983). The Court in Lacey also found the "trial 
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court must determine by a process of logic and reason, based upon 
common experience, whether the juror can stand in attitude of 
indifference between the state and the accused." J^ d. at 1312 citing 
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981). Although the Court in 
Lacey noted it might have been better to have excused the juror who 
had been treated by the doctor who testified in the rape case, and 
who had a business relationship with the investigating officer, the 
Court found no error in leaving the juror on the panel. It should 
be noted, however, that the credibility of both of the witnesses 
whom the juror knew in Lacey was not questioned, nor was their 
testimony crucial to the prosecution's case. Lacey at 1312. 
In State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (Utah 1984) the Court found 
no prejudicial error in failing to remove one challenged juror for 
cause who had had training in drug abuse in the army and who had 
friends who were police officers. The Court found no indication of 
an impression so strong or so deep so as to constitute bias. The 
Court did, however, find prejudicial error in refusing to remove a 
Mr. Butler for cause in this distribution of controlled substance 
case. Mr. Butler indicated he "had a problem with the criminal over 
the police officer." I_d. at 26. Butler further acknowledged if the 
evidence were close he felt the detectives should be give the 
benefit of the doubt. Id. 
In Jenk ins v. P a r r i s h , 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1981) , a medical 
m a l p r a c t i c e s u i t , the Court found a j u r o r ' s admiss ion she was b iased 
toward the p h y s i c i a n - d e f e n d a n t , d e s p i t e her d e s i r e t o remain f a i r 
and i m p a r t i a l should have r e s u l t e d in a succes s fu l cha l l enge for 
cause under Rule 4 7 ( f ) ( 6 ) Utah R. Civ . P . Rule 47 ( f ) ( 6 ) p rov ides 
for a challenge for cause when a "state of mind exists on the part 
the juror with reference to the cause • . . which will prevent him 
from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial 
rights of the party challenging." Utah R. Civ. P. 47. The Court 
noted "[a] statement made by a juror that she intends to be fair and 
impartial loses much of its meaning in light of other testimony and 
facts which suggest bias." Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d at 536. 
The trial court in this case never adequately determined 
whether Mr. Carter could "stand in attitude of indifference between 
the state and the accused." State v. Lacey at 1312. The fact that 
the trial court is entitled to perform voir dire is not to say that 
the trial court should fail to exercise the discretion conferred on 
it by state law. Although there is no strict test to apply, the 
accused should be granted every reasonable protection. State v. 
Lockett, 654 P.2d 433, 438 (Kansas 1982), State v. Camarillo, 678 
P.2d 102, 104 (Idaho App. 1984). The courtfs lengthy question, 
summarized by asking Mr. Carter if he would "have any difficulty in 
hearing the case today" failed to ascertain whether he might have 
any bias in hearing the case before him. 
In State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1980), the 
Supreme court reversed the conviction because the trial court failed 
to rebut a clear inference of bias, and subsequently failed to 
remove a juror for cause. The trial court in the case at bar never 
determined if Mr. Carter could listen to and try the case without 
prejudice as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 47. The clear inference of 
bias was never rebutted. Forcing the defense to exercise a 
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peremtory challenge to remove Mr, Carter resulted in prejudicial 
error when the facts pointed to a state of mind which reasonably 
inferred prejudice. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RESTRICTING DEFENSE^ 
COUNSEL'S QUESTIONING OP PROSPECTIVE JURORS 
DURING VOIR DIRE. 
During voir dire, defense counsel asked the court to 
explain the minimum and maximum penalties for Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol in Utah and further to inquire if anyone 
thought the penalty was either too harsh or too light. (T.15). The 
court refused to allow the question to be put to the panel. Id. 
Defense counsel took exception to the court's ruling. Id. 
In State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984), the Court held 
failure of the trial court to inquire of the non-drinking jurors in 
a DUI case whether their abstenance from alcohol was for religious 
reasons was reversible error. One non-drinking juror in Ball was 
then allowed to serve on the jury. In Ball the Supreme Court noted 
"exploration of the attitudes and convictions that may exist in a 
person who belongs to these groups is certainly permissible to aid 
in discovering actual bias or prejudice relating to the subject 
matter of particular case." I^ d. at 1057. "Voir dire is intended to 
provide a tool for counsel and the court to carefully and skillfully 
determine by inquiry, whether biases and prejudices, latent as well 
as acknowledged, will interfere with a fair trial if a particular 
juror serves on it." Id. at 1058. 
In People v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 877 (Cal. 1981) the 
court concluded: 
[c]ounsel should aj: least be allowed to inquire 
into "matters concerning which either the local 
community or the population at large is commonly 
known to harbor strong feelings that may stop 
short of presumptive bias in law yet 
significantly skew deliberations in fact." citing 
United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 381, 
(D.C. Cir. 1973) 
In the case at bar, neither party had the opportunity to 
determine whether potential jurors should be removed because they 
believed the penalty was either too harsh or too lenient. Defense 
counsel does not dispute the court's exclusive control (at the 
misdemeanor level) over sentencing within the statutory guidelines, 
but stresses imposition of penalty and beliefs regarding penalty are 
not to be confused. In another court, defense counsel has had the 
experience of having a juror removed for cause who felt the 
statutory six-month maximum on a DUI conviction was too light a 
penalty. Any such similar jurors in this case would have been 
challenged by the defense. Failure of the court to allow inquiry 
regarding views toward penalty unjustly curtailed Mr. Tuero's right 
to a fair trial. His conviction should therefore be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Tuero asks this Court to reverse his conviction or in 
the alternative to remand his case to the Fifth Circuit Court for a 
new trial.
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Respectfully submitted this y^ day of May,1987. 
-ELIZABETH A< BdWMAN 
Attorney foe/Defendant 
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I, ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN, hereby certify that four copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant will be delivered to the Salt Lake 
City Prosecutor's Office 451 South Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 this (r <3ay of May, 1987. 
.-"-"ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DELIVERED by this 
day of May, 1987. 
ADDENDUM A 
77-35-18. Rule 18 — Selection of jury, (a) The clerk shall draw by 
lot and call the number of the jurors that are to try the cause plus such 
an additional number as will allow for all peremptory challenges permit-
ted. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror shall be called 
to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any such new 
juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause are com-
pleted, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, 
beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory chal-
lenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until 
all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then 
call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to con-
stitute the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the 
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the 
examination of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examina-
tion. In the latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant 
to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, 
or may itself submit to the prospective jurors additional questions 
requested by counsel or the defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. 
(1) Thej>anel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particularcourt 
or for the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objec-
tion made to all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material depar-
ture from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, drawing, 
summoning and return of the panel. 
274 
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(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn 
and shall be in writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall specifically 
set forth the facts constituting the grounds of the challenge. 
(Hi) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a hear-
ing may be had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is 
based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be called as * wit-
nesses at the hearing thereon. 
(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel 
is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question 
is concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall direct the selection 
of jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for 
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury 
is sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit 
it to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is 
presented. In chaUenges for_cause the rules relating to challenges ^ to^a 
panel and hearings theron shall apply. All challenges for cause shall be 
taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptoryjchallenge is an objection to a juror for which no rea-
son need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory 
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory 
challenges. In misdemeanor jases^each sidejsjsntitled to three peremptory 
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the 
defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exer-
cised separately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and 
may be taken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) Want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law; 
(2) Any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of 
performing the duties of a juror, 
(3) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person 
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the 
prosecution was instituted; 
(4) The existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other rela-
tionship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person 
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which rela-
tionship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that ^ 
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict 
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqual-
ified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or a political 
subdivision thereof; 
(5) Having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil 
action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in a 
criminal prosecution; 
(6) Having served on the grand jury which found the indictment; 
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(7) Having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for 
the particular offense charged; 
(8) Having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, 
and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without as verdict 
after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) Having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the 
defendant for the act charged as an offense; 
(10) If the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining 
of such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude 
the juror from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction 
regardless of the facts; 
(11) Because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or 
interested in earring on any business, calling or employment, the carrying 
on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a like 
offense; 
(12) Because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant 
on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(13) Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
*y> (14) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference 
to the cause, or to either party, which willprevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice Jto the substantial rights of the party challeng-
ing; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or 
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly upon 
the matter to be submitted to him. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and 
then by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed 
before peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impanelled. Alternate 
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors, who are, 
or become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The prosecution 
> and defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each 
alternate juror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the same oath 
and enjoy the same privileges as regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a privilege of the 
person exempted and is not a ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the 
jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try 
the matter in issue between the parties, and render a true verdict accord-
ing to the evidence and the instructions of the court | 
History: C. 1953, 77-35-18, enacted by L. Cross-References. 
1980, ch. 14, § 1. Alternate juror, 78-46-6. 
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